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PREFACE
Emergencies and disaster situations require a rapid and timely response by
the health services. For several years, the Pan American Health Organization
has promoted the development of activities to reduce vulnerability of the
health sector to disasters and to strengthen emergency and disaster pre-
paredness plans.
Recent disasters in Central America, such as Hurricanes Mitch and Georges
in 1998 and the El Salvador earthquake in 2001, have underscored the
importance of including the activities of  public health laboratories, clinical
laboratories, and blood banks in the health sector's emergency plans.Three
areas should be given priority:
• Diagnostic confirmation of communicable diseases with high mortality
rates;
• Availability of basic tests used in caring for the injured;
• Timely provision of safe blood.
The purpose of this guide is to sensitize and orient health authorities, labo-
ratory directors, laboratory technicians, and blood bank personnel to the
identification of responsibilities and functions of laboratory and blood bank
services in disaster situations, taking into account priorities, needs, and the
local capacity for immediate response.
The response of health services to disaster situations will be improved when
activities to mitigate and reduce vulnerability and to restore and reorganize
laboratory and blood bank services are incorporated in emergency plans.
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I - INTRODUCTION
One of the principal problems in directing interventions, instituting pre-
ventive measures, and managing cases appropriately in disaster situations is
the lack of basic information from the affected area. In particular, basic
information about the possible emergence of communicable diseases is dif-
ficult to obtain in disaster-affected zones.
The following factors influence the emergence and spread of communica-
ble diseases:
• Changes in population density, displacement of population, and/or
exposure to the elements;
• A change in the ecological balance that facilitates the proliferation of
vectors;
• Displacement of animals, which fosters the development of zoonoses;
• Disruption and contamination of the water supply and sanitation ser-
vices;
• Emergency provision of food and water and sanitary conditions in shel-
ters, which are potential sources of infectious disease;
• Relative reduction in the response capacity of the health services net-
work due to damage to the health services infrastructure (i.e., hospitals,
health centers, and laboratories) or due to increased demand;
• Disorganized public health programs.
The impact of disasters on health infrastructure and services requires spe-
cific emergency measures to:
• Ensure basic services to care for the affected population, and
• Reestablish the surveillance system.
In order to guarantee effective intervention by laboratories and blood banks
during a period that is characterized by disorganized interventions, inade-
quate definition of the different actors’ roles, and late confirmation of out-
breaks, it is necessary to:
• Reduce the vulnerability of laboratories and blood banks;
• Integrate the plans of laboratories and blood banks with the hospital
emergency plan and/or national emergency plan;
• Assure speedy diagnosis of the diseases classically found in the wake of
disasters;
7
I . I n t r o d u c t i o n
• Secure the delivery of clinical laboratory services for basic and essential
tests;
• Ensure the availability of safe blood supplies in response to immediate
demand.
8
II - PREPAREDNESS AND MITIGATION
Preparedness
Laboratories and blood banks should prepare emergency plans and incor-
porate them into the health sector's general disaster plans, in coordination
with the national disaster program and departments of epidemiology.
In preparing emergency plans it is necessary to:
• Consider the risk of disaster from natural, technological, social, or bio-
logical causes to the country or to a particular region, and identify pos-
sible health and needs scenarios based on previous experiences;
• Evaluate vulnerability to epidemics based on the epidemiologic profiles
of each country or specific region;
• Determine the physical and organizational vulnerability of the services;
• Assess the vulnerability of the life lines that guarantee the operation of
services, that is,water and electricity supply,communications,and trans-
portation;
• Evaluate the organizational and institutional response capacity,and iden-
tify the roles and duties of the key staff members;
• Establish mechanisms for coordination between the network of labora-
tories and other related institutions such as health services,military hos-
pitals, ministry of agriculture, universities, social security institutions,
and customs houses;
• Disseminate the emergency plan widely and train the staff that play an
important role in its execution;
• Conduct periodic simulations to test the viability of the plans;
• Develop a budget for disaster preparedness and response activities;
• Institutionalize, through ministerial resolutions or directives, emergency
plans for laboratories in the event of disasters.
The specific preparedness considerations for laboratories and blood banks
are described in chapters III and V.
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Mitigation 
Disaster mitigation begins by conducting a vulnerability analysis to identify
the critical points in the system that may be subject to risk.
The following factors should be taken into account during vulnerability
analysis:
• Structural elements that support the weight of the building (e.g.,beams,
columns, and load-bearing walls);
• Nonstructural elements, including  architectural features (such as exte-
rior walls, windows, ceilings, etc.); critical systems (including water,
electricity, and communications); and a building's contents (supplies,
equipment, and furniture);
• Functional elements, including aspects of interior design (use of space,
access to and relationship of different critical areas of a facility); and
exterior design (for example, access routes to the facility).
Administrative and organizational elements must also be considered and
include the presence of signs,emergency doors and exits, and fire extin-
guishers. Personnel training and awareness of disaster preparedness are
critical administrative elements. Coordination with other institutions,
such as the fire department, during simulation exercises, is another of
the functional elements to consider as part of disaster mitigation.
The following are aspects of structural vulnerability studies:
• Performing a visual inspection of the facilities and/or requesting an
expert assessment in order to determine which areas might be affected
by different types of hazards, and
• Assigning competent professionals to study a facility's vulnerability to
natural disaster.
Based on these analyses, responsible authorities should conduct a cost/ben-
efit analysis of recommended structural and nonstructural interventions, tak-
ing into account the benefits expected in terms of financial and social
losses.
Following are steps to reduce the vulnerability of nonstructural elements:
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• Identify and classify the nonstructural elements that represent risk to
human life,property loss,or loss of the facility's ability to function in the
event of disaster (see Annex 1);
• Store hazardous materials in a safe, remote location. Remove vulnerable
architectural elements such as false ceiling made of tiles or plaster;
• Secure gas tanks, oxygen tanks, and generators to the floor or walls;
• Attach diagnostic equipment and centrifuges to counters, walls, or
panels;
• Anchor heavy equipment with bolts or cables;
• Secure filing cabinets and shelving to the floors and walls;
• Store laboratory glassware in containers and keep a reasonable amount
of space between them;
• Cover glass or fragile materials with plastic;
• Choose safe places for chemical and biological reagents and cultures to
minimize the risk of contamination and fire in a disaster;
• Guarantee the provision of basic services such as water, electricity, and
communications during and immediately after the disaster;
• Determine the minimum amount of water the facility should have in
reserve in order to function in a disaster situation;
• Ensure that the installation has sufficient water storage capacity (such
as a cistern) to operate for at least two days independently of external
supply;
• Identify the areas where a supply of water is vital for operation in order
to determine necessary rationing;
• Procure an electric generator capable of providing power in case of
emergency;
• Identify the areas and equipment that should be connected to the emer-
gency electric power plant and inventory the equipment that needs
special protection in connection with essential laboratory functions
(see Annex 2);
• Ensure that laboratory and blood bank cold storage are connected to
the emergency energy supply;
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• Store supplies and tools in accessible, safe places that allow for their
rapid retrieval in emergencies;
• Clean and continually maintain the drainage and sewer channels;
• Ensure climate control where needed.
In order to reduce organizational and administrative vulnerability,
these actions should be taken:
• Establish appropriate layout and connections between areas in the facil-
ity, and determine administrative processes and routines to guarantee
adequate operation under both normal and emergency conditions;
• Identify evacuation routes, emergency exits, danger zones, areas where
there is a risk of exposure to toxic substances, and the location of
alarms and fire extinguishers, and mark them with signs.
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III - PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORIES
The main responsibility of the public health laboratory network is to estab-
lish early diagnosis of diseases with high mortality rates (see Annex 3) and
to notify the department of epidemiology. Diseases typically associated with
disaster situations include:
• Water-borne and foodborne diseases;
• Acute respiratory infections and reemergence of subacute infections;
• Bacterial meningitis;
• Vector-borne diseases;
• Zoonoses;
• Vaccine-preventable diseases.
Disaster Preparedness Stage
The central reference laboratory is the institution designated to organize the
emergency plan and coordinate actions to be taken by the laboratory net-
work.As part of disaster preparedness, the following steps should be taken:
1. Confirm that the central reference laboratory is the coordinating insti-
tution for the laboratory network in emergencies;
2. Provide for an alternate laboratory with technical-managerial capacity
similar to that of the reference laboratory in the event that the reference
laboratory does not maintain optimum capacity;
3. Establish a functional network of strategically located laboratories
appropriate to geopolitical conditions in the country, access routes, and
communication;
4. Define the response capacity by laboratory level;
5. Maintain a current list of laboratory personnel in order to define their
roles in an emergency;
6. Train laboratory staff for integration into the multidisciplinary teams or
rapid intervention brigades that investigate outbreaks;
7. Establish a flow chart and protocols for shipping specimens within the
laboratory network in keeping with international biosafety standards
(see Annex 4);
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8. Standardize, update, and distribute manuals of procedures for diagnos-
ing diseases;
9. Provide the central laboratory and certain strategically located labora-
tories with a stock of rapid diagnostic tests;
10. Equip the central and alternate laboratories with portable laboratories
for field testing, to include identification of etiological agents of out-
breaks and inspection of water and food in keeping with the institu-
tional capacities of each country;
11. Establish official outside support channels for the diagnosis of unusual
infectious agents.
Emergency Stage: Immediate Response
Actions immediately following event
Immediately after the event, the following steps should be taken:
1. Assess the damage in order to restore, reactivate, and reorganize the lab-
oratory network (see Chapter II).
2. Incorporate the trained laboratory staff into rapid intervention brigades.
3. Provide brigades with portable laboratories and/or supplies for field
testing and sampling.
4. Coordinate activities closely with the national disaster and epidemiol-
ogy programs.
Reactivating the laboratory network
Actions necessary to reactivate and reorganize the laboratory network fol-
lowing a disaster, in priority order, are:
1. Reestablish the basic operations of the affected local laboratories;
2. Prioritize the provision of transportation, sampling supplies, and labora-
tory reagents to the affected areas in accordance with the first estimates
of cases;
3. Ensure efficient receipt and processing of specimens;
4. Issue an early, accurate diagnosis of the diseases;
5. Establish flexible communication channels in the network to ensure
information dissemination and feedback;
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6. Determine the causes, sources, and means of transmission of the
diseases;
7. Update the knowledge of local technical personnel;
8. Maintain records and data.
Local actions: presumptive diagnosis
In emergencies, it is unrealistic to expect the use of diagnostic techniques
that are not generally found at the local level. However, rapid, accurate diag-
nosis of many infectious disease can be accomplished through microscopic
examination. Basic tests for certain infectious diseases include:
• Cholera—motility and Gram stain
• Meningitis—Gram stain
• Pneumonia due to pneumococcus—Gram stain
• Malaria—thick blood film
• Tuberculosis—microscopic examination
The use of rapid diagnostic tests is an alternative for early diagnosis at the
local level;however,a test to confirm the first positive cases detected should
be performed systematically at the central level.Tests available on the mar-
ket are as follows (this is not an exhaustive list):
• Cholera (immunoenzyme test)
• Rotavirus (agglutination)
• Bacterial meningitis (soluble antigens)
• Malaria (immunochromatography)
• Dengue (IgM)
• Leptospirosis (IgM)
Actions at the central level: case confirmation
For cultures and serological tests, it is recommended that the specimens be
sent directly to the higher level laboratory in accordance with the system
established in the disaster preparedness stage.
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Post-Emergency Stage
The post-emergency stage involves strengthening surveillance and disease
control in accordance with the organizational systems present in the coun-
try.This requires a focus on tracer diseases, especially with respect to out-
break characteristics (for example, circulating microbial serotypes, antimi-
crobial resistance profiles, virulence factors, sources, vectors, risk factors)
and trend analysis. Other diseases under surveillance in the country should
not be neglected.
At this stage, a thorough evaluation of the actions taken in connection with
all operational aspects of the emergency plan should be conducted, and
appropriate corrective measures established.
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IV - CLINICAL LABORATORIES
Immediately after the event, a damage assessment should be made in order
to restore, reactivate, and reorganize the laboratories.
In the vast majority of cases, the diseases reported in an emergency and the
leading causes of death can be clinically identified. Treatment can be pre-
sumptive and symptomatic.
The health authorities should ensure the availability of personnel, supplies,
and equipment at the local level. Equipment must be available to conduct
the following essential tests:
• Hemogram with white cell, red cell, and platelet counts; and hemoglo-
bin and hematocrit determinations;
• Electrolytes, glucose, urea, transaminases;
• Blood group and Rh factor;
• Arterial gases (in accordance with capacity).
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V - BLOOD BANKS
The National Blood Commission or Council will, within the framework of
the national emergency plan, provide intervention guidelines as outlined
below.
Disaster Preparedness Stage at the National Level
• Establish a national reference blood bank to coordinate operations and
designate centers that are strategically located in accordance with
geopolitical conditions in the country, type of emergency, access routes,
and communications;
• Provide for a blood bank or alternate health service with technical-man-
agerial capacity similar to that of the reference blood bank, in the event
that the reference bank fails to function following the disaster;
• Maintain an inventory of blood bank personnel;
• Organize the communications systems of the blood banks, transfusion
services, and the reference bank;
• Ensure that information is transmitted about the need for and invento-
ry of immediately available blood and components;
• Organize the transportation of the blood and components to the af-
fected areas as necessary, taking advantage of the cold chain established
for supplies such as drugs and vaccines;
• Define mechanisms for blood reception, pre-transfusion tests, and trans-
fusion in the disaster-affected areas;
• Plan blood collection in accordance with needs;
• Organize simulation exercises.
At each blood bank, define and establish functions for the different work
areas, taking into account higher demand, reduced capacity to provide ser-
vices, and the need for alternate local sites to absorb demand.These func-
tions will include:
• Donor reception and orientation, including telephone assistance, donor
selection, blood collection, and post-donation donor care;
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• Screening tests;
• Blood grouping;
• Component separation;
• Release of products for transfusion;
• Shipments of blood and components, including the receipt of requests
for blood and components and coordination with land and air transport;
• Administrative/logistical support (delivery of material, establish shifts
for personnel, role of volunteer personnel, statistical information, infor-
mation to the communications media).
Emergency Stage: Immediate Response
• Assess the need for blood;
• Confirm the number of units available for immediate release to the
affected areas;
• Evaluate the contribution of unprocessed units of blood available in the
blood banks;
• Determine the ability to meet the demand before beginning to make
appeals to the community and causing more panic than an emergency
already entails;
• Proceed with appeals to the community if absolutely necessary;
• Concentrate volunteer donation centers in areas that are not congested;
• Collect blood in accordance with the standards in the country, includ-
ing implementation of all screening tests (HIV, HBV, HCV, syphilis,
Chagas’), ABO and Rh grouping, component separation, release of
approved products for transfusion;
• Accept donors who have previously donated blood, when possible;
• Process the units of blood in accordance with the standards in the
country;
• As necessary, mobilize skilled health workers who are trained to collect
blood.
20
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Post-Emergency Stage
• Assess compliance with the existing emergency plan and take the
appropriate corrective action;
• Evaluate coverage of the demand and, at a minimum, determine:
- Number of units dispatched versus units requested;
- Number of units dispatched versus units transfused;
- Number of discarded units and reasons for discard (this should
include all the units collected in response to the event);
• Replace stock (including supplies, reagents, and budget affected by the
increase in demand);
• Check the inventory and use of the supplies of blood and components;
• Notify the responsible authorities of the actions taken;
• Report to and thank the community for the blood donations.
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ANNEXES
Annex 1
Analysis of nonstructural vulnerability, consequences, 
probable damage, and types of risk
*The probable consequences and damage due to inadequate protection or installation can be:
collapse of the equipment, breakage, displacement, operating defects, decalibration, loss of data,
etc.
**Risks can be classified as:  Risk to human life
 Risk of loss of function
 Risk of property loss
Nonstructural elements Consequences and damage * Type of  risk**
Architectural
• Dividers and partitions
• Interiors
• Façades
• False ceilings
• Coverings
• Cornices
• Terraces
• Facings
• Windows
• Appendages (signs, etc.)
• Ceilings
• Antennas
Equipment and furniture
• Medical/laboratory equipment
• Industrial equipment
• Office equipment
• Furniture
• Contents
• Supplies
• Files
• Shelving
• Cold chain
Basic installations
• Electricity
• Medical/laboratory gases
• Industrial gas
• Telecommunications
• Drinking water
• Industrial water
• Air conditioning/heating
• Steam
• Pipes in general
A n n e x e s
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Annex 2
Basic list of laboratory equipment requiring
special protection
• Microscope
• Refrigerator
• Freezer
• Incubator
• Centrifuge
• Autoclave
• Laminar flow systems
• Precision scale
• ELISA equipment
• Automated analytical equipment
• Spectrophotometer
• Computer equipment
A n n e x e s
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Annex 3
Specimen, rapid diagnosis, reference methodology, and
turnaround time by groups of diseases
Group of diseases Specimen Transport Rapid Reference Turnaround
medium presumptive methodology times
diagnosis
Food- and waterborne
diseases
Acute diarrheal diseases Stool Cary Blair --- Culture 2-3 days
Cholera Stool Cary Blair Motility Culture Immediate to 1 day
Rapid text
Viral diarrheal diseases Stool < 4 hours Latex agglutination ELISA Immediate to 1 week
Hepatitis A Blood Serum (Transaminases) ELISA 2 days to 1 week
Typhoid Blood Blood No Blood culture 3 days to 1 week
Acute respiratory infections
Pneumonia Sputum < 4 hours Gram stain Culture 2 days
Whooping cough Nasopharyng. Bordet Gengou No Culture 1 week
Regan-Lowe
Diphtheria Nasopharyng. Loefler Microscopy Culture 2 days
Tuberculosis Sputum Flask Microscopy Culture 1-3 days
3 week culture
Bacterial meningitis CSF < 2 hours
Room temp. Soluble antigens Culture Immediate to 2 days
Vector-borne diseases
Malaria Blood Blood Thick blood film/ Thick blood film/
Giemsa Giemsa 1/2 hour
Dengue Blood Serum Rapid test ELISA/culture 3 days to 1 week
Other hemorrhagic diseases Blood Serum No ELISA/culture 3 days to 1 week
Zoonoses
Rabies Blood Serum No ELISA IgM 3 days to 1 week
Leptospirosis Blood Serum Rapid test Agglutination 1 day
Plague Bubo Serum Wayson stain Blood culture 2 days to 1 week
or blood Immunofluorescence Passive
hemagglutination
Hantavirus Blood Serum ELISA IgM 3 days to 1 week
Vaccine-preventable diseases
Measles Blood Serum ELISA IgM 2 days to 1 week
Polio Blood Serum ELISA IgM 2 days to 1 week
A n n e x e s
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Annex 4
Triple packing system for the transportation of diagnostic 
specimens and infectious substances
Primary container with
the material
Absorbent packaging
material
Screw-on
cap
Secondary
container
Details of the contents
(specimen)
Screw-on cap
Biohazard label
Outside container
Address label
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